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NatioNal Media as a ProjectioN  
of a devastatiNg effect  
of exterNal iNflueNces
ProBleM forMulatioN
Identifying and preventing threats to national security in the country’s information 
sphere caused by the destructive impact of external information flows are among 
priority tasks of governments that adequately assess today’s security challenges 
and care about the people’s future. Therefore, the search for methodologies, tools, 
methods and means of forecasting and timely counteracting potential information 
aggression is on the foreground. Steps to be taken can be infrastructural, legal, tech-
nological, institutional and others. Incidentally, this applies both to established de-
mocracies, for example, the United States (this refers to external interference in the 
latest election campaign) and transitional democracies (Pravda, 2018). According to 
the U.S. National Security Strategy, “Russia uses information operations as part of 
its offensive cyber efforts to influence public opinion across the globe. Its influence 
campaigns include secret intelligence operations, false online personas, state-funded 
media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or “trolls” (White-
house.gov, 2018).
As for transitional democracies, Ukraine is the brightest example. No coun-
try today is insured against external destructive information influence. In the fall 
of 2017, the Council of Europe issued a Statement on the state of the European 
and global information space (Council of Europe, 2018). The topic of the report 
of the Council of Europe is “information disorder,” which reveals major current 
challenges and threatening trends, offering measures to confront confusion in the 
information space both at the state level and that of ordinary citizens (Council of 
Europe, 2018).
Government agencies, special forces, scientists, civil society representatives, and 
experts are looking for and offering not only means to expose fakes or fight “fake 
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truth,” but more often seek to find “threat markers” for a proactive response in cases 
where the situation in a country or region indicates that the background is being 
created for the deliberate external information interference. In other words, they try 
to identify the weakest link in the chain of dissemination of destructive informa-
tion. Undoubtedly, this is a multidisciplinary problem that requires the involvement 
of methods of various sciences. Among them, humanitarian ones: sociology, social 
psychology, and conflictology, as well as technological areas – cybersecurity, infor-
mation technology, communication systems protection, etc. In our opinion, today, at 
the time of “hybridization” of threats to national security, it is impossible to define 
them in advance and prepare an “antidote.” Threats, especially in the field of infor-
mation, transform much faster than it is possible to define them and propose coun-
termeasures. Therefore, in our opinion, it is worthwhile to identify potentially weak 
spots and have at hand a prepared set of tools to neutralize a threat. In general, our 
article is intended to facilitate the search for vulnerabilities in the national informa-
tion security system.
aNalYsis of receNt researcH WorKs  
aNd PuBlicatioNs
The theoretical basis of our study is the principle presented in the “two-stage commu-
nication model” by P. Lazarsfeld and E. Katz. In its practical manifestations, we will 
rely on the widespread theory of one of the representatives of the theory of “neoliberal-
ism,” J. Nye Jr., namely the construction of “soft power.”
A thorough study of the issue is provided in the analytical report prepared by 
“Media Detector” NGO – “Index of the Kremlin Information Impact.” According 
to experts, it is a “tool developed by a group of think tanks in Eastern and Cen-
tral Europe to measure the capacity of the Russian government to influence the 
information space of other countries to reach its goals.” The report contains the 
results of pilot assessment for Ukraine, Georgia, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
in 2017.
The research confirms that Russian mass media (such as “Sputnik,” “RT,” NTV, 
Russia 1, Russia 24, etc.) play no significant role in spreading the Kremlin narratives 
among the citizens of both Ukraine and its western neighbors. They are a source of 
senses for local pro-Russian media, including questionable media outlets; local and 
national media can also be referred to them, when they disseminate interpretations of 
events in line with the Kremlin propaganda.
Researchers also confirm the existence of the model called “change of a carrier 
of the propaganda virus” – from absurd messages in mainstream media to the ex-
ploitation of national second-class mass media of dubious origin. They are either 
created by the Kremlin’s ideological bloc, or financed by it via local pro-Russian 
organizations. As a result, citizens “shift away” from mainstream media and start 
looking for alternative sources on the Internet, where they find sources specifically 
created to this end. Nowadays, some Internet sources are used as a “trans-shipment 
base” for destructive information, but it has not always been the case. Taking into 
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account the active pressure of governments and expert communities on social me-
dia owners and search engines, there is no guarantee that traditional media will 
not regain their position (UNIAN, 2018). At the time of preparation of the article, 
attention was paid to the unlawful actions of political groups and hacker units af-
filiated with them, aimed at unlawfully obtaining and exploiting private informa-
tion (CNN, 2018).
The unwillingness of the network to responsibly disseminate information gave 
a new breath to the system of Russian propaganda, which very professionally adapts 
to consumers’ new demands. Additionally, international experts revealed the tech-
nologies of influence used by Russian media in the occupied territories of Ukraine 
and Georgia. They use the method of information isolation of these territories and 
their integration into the Russian media field, blocking citizens’ access to independ-
ent media. Instead, they provide access to Russian or Kremlin-controlled media, 
making the television signal either free of charge or setting a rather symbolic fee 
(Media Sapiens, 2018). In 2015, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology stud-
ied the Index of effectiveness of Russian propaganda. Scientists understand the ef-
fectiveness of Russian propaganda in Ukraine as people’s support of key messages 
of Russian propaganda in Ukraine or in some of its territories. In their view, the 
effective counteraction to Russian propaganda in Donbas may reduce the influx of 
new militants into the ranks of occupation forces, and also deprive the aggressor of 
the ability to attract to the opposition population from eastern and southern regions 
of Ukraine (KIIS, 2018). D. Volkov and S. Goncharov, Russian sociologists from 
Levada Center, conducted their own study of independent (in Russian classification) 
and patriotic mass media and made, at first glance, a controversial conclusion. They 
say that the more informed audience is not always more opposition-oriented and 
neither does it demonstrate more critical thinking. They give the following example: 
the activity of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is approved by 80% of those 
who appeal to three or more independent media, as well as 66% of those who don’t 
choose independent media. In addition, the activities of the permanent leader of the 
LDPR, Volodymyr Zhirinovsky, is supported by the 51% of respondents from the 
first group and 46% – from the second. Also, researchers note that in the past three 
years, the difference in the estimates of events between those who live in Moscow 
and residents of other regions has almost disappeared (Vedomosti, 2018). The re-
sults of voting in the last presidential election in Russia confirmation of this thesis 
(Vedomosti, 2018). Our hypothesis that over time the state propaganda becomes 
extremely costly for the state budget and not so effective, is proved by data from 
Russian sources. Thus, the Russian agency RBC has already noticed that soft power, 
namely, the maintenance of those non-state structures that, in fact, would have to 
implement “soft” information penetration to those states, where there are important 
foreign policy interests of Moscow, are becoming “unbearable” for the state budget. 
According to the materials in the official system “Electronic Budget,” the cost of 
state funds to such non-governmental institutions will decrease. RBC calculated that 
subsidies to the Public Diplomacy Support Fund and the Russian Council for In-
ternational Affairs will be reduced by 8% compared with 2014–2016 (see: Charts 1 
and 2) (RBC, 2018).
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chart 1. government subsidies for the gorchakov fund and riac (in millions of rubles)
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source: https://www.rbc.ru/economics/24/07/2017/59723c879a794741088d42d8?utm_source=pushc (21.01.2018).
chart 2. Whose money do “foreign policy” NPo spend? 
for 2016, in milliones of rubles
Russian International Affairs Council
Total – 130.6
Gorchakov Fund
Total – 102.1
budgetary funds
funds from Russian
organizations and
citizens
earnings
9
11.7
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48.4
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15
source: https://www.rbc.ru/economics/24/07/2017/59723c879a794741088d42d8?utm_source=pushc (21.01.2018).
HigHligHtiNg tHe PreviouslY uNsettled Parts  
of tHe geNeral ProBleM
The change of the information influence model, which involves national media of 
both mainstream and secondary levels, will be at the center of our attention. Main-
stream media are those national media, which are the most widespread, and second-
ary media are those who have a “niche” audience or the audience whose members 
are united by certain topics, ideologies, or interests. We want to test the hypothesis 
that the implementation of destructive information influence through local media 
is an intermediate phase from the so-called “absurd messages,” such as “the cruci-
fied boy,” to pseudo-or real propaganda events that are becoming more and more 
burdensome for the state budget. At the same time, its efficiency falls, and requires 
more and more human, financial and media resources. That is, state propaganda, 
along with ineffective state administration, external sanctions, and falling economic 
indicators, wastes funds from the state treasury. Schematically it can be represented 
in the following way:
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Absurd messages
Dissemination of
distorted information
through dubious mass
media (after truth)
Creation of costly 
pseudo- and 
propagandistic 
real events
Accordingly, it encourages the use of new formats of the “creation of costly news,” 
typical for the “soft power.”
For example:
International Youth and Student Festival in Sochi (October 2017); –
137 Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in St. Petersburg (October 2017). –
In our view, this list should also include illegal, from the point of view of interna-
tional law, construction of the Kerch Strait Bridge. It reminds the construction of the 
Baikal-Amur Highway in the Soviet period. The information support is identical in 
both cases.
The 2014 Olympics in Sochi had similar goals. According to the official data, the 
Russian government spent more than $50 billion on this event. However, doping scan-
dals wiped out both the victory of the Russian team, and the amount of money that 
was spent. In general, such actions have a prolonged effect. At first, a lot of mediafakes 
were used, but now they have lost its power, because both people and machines (arti-
ficial intelligence) learned how to distinguish them. So, if not the efforts of the Inter-
national Olympic Committee (IOC) and the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the 
Sochi propaganda effect would be much longer. Accordingly, the “investment” would 
be more effective and could have reached the next similar event – the FIFA World Cup 
in June 2018. Mundial is now in danger of becoming not a new propaganda pretext, as 
the 1936 Olympics in Berlin, but on the contrary, an occasion for counter-initiatives 
and informational attacks on the Russian government. Most likely, the organizer of the 
sports forum in Russia has taken this perspective into account, because some measures 
have already been taken to neutralize it (Bellona, 2017). However, it is not possible to 
avoid the diplomatic demarche (Gordon, 2018).
forMulatioN of tHe goals of tHe article aNd tHe MaiN  
Material aNd results of tHe studY PreseNtatioN
We will define reference points on the political map of Central and Eastern Europe, 
where the Russian impact in informational, military, political and other spheres is the 
evidence of its aggressive geopolitical intentions. It will be done in order to confirm 
our scientific hypothesis that the destructive use of dubious media and its financing is 
done systematically and effective in those places, where Russia has certain interests.
According to Russian analyst Maksim Samorukov, Russia apparently wants to 
change the post-Cold War order and tries to promote its interests outside the post-
Soviet space. Western Balkans is not yet a priority area of Russian foreign policy, 
unlike Ukraine, Syria, Libya or Afghanistan. But it remains the subject of Moscow’s 
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interest and sometimes is used for propaganda purposes and diplomatic maneuvers 
(Carnegie, 2017).
Other sources indicate that the Balkans will become a place for promoting Russian 
interests in the medium-term period. The national media of the “second” and “third” 
echelons will be used as a source of destructive influence (Politeka, 2017). Russel Mid, 
the American scientist, professor at Bard College (USA), editor of the American Inter-
est, wrote in his article in The Wall Street Journal that the prospect of EU membership 
of such states as Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well 
as Kosovo could preserve a fragile peace in the Western Balkans. He also wrote that 
each Balkan country would rather join the EU than Russia or Turkey (The Wall Street 
Journal, 2017). His expert prognosis turned out to be rather precise, because in the 
beginning of 2018 reports of official EU representatives on the accelerated model of 
entry of some Balkan countries into the European Union into EU appeared (European 
Commission, 2018).
The “Eyes Wide Shut” report, prepared by the Belgrade Center for Euro-Atlantic 
Studies, confirms our assumption that the international media channel Russia Today is 
the most prominent in the region (Slidelegend, 2016). It has the format of western chan-
nels, such as CNN or BBC. However, Russia Today doesn’t meet the standards of control 
and ethics. This is a classic example of the twenty-first century propaganda. The Kremlin 
hires “lobbyists” in order to promote its image and interests abroad. In some cases, they 
involve lobbying organizations directly, as it was in the case with Henry Kissinger, or use 
those who promote the position of the Kremlin in media about a particular situation.
According to the Serbian law on public information and media, representatives of 
foreign media (editors, journalists, photojournalists, TV operators and other associ-
ate members) and foreign media correspondents have the same rights and obligations 
during implementation of their activities, as representatives of local media. There-
fore, “Sputnik” is currently one of the main tools for creating and disseminating Rus-
sian “soft power” across Serbia. The access to this Internet portal can also be granted 
through digital radio programs, as well as through a mobile application with more than 
a hundred thousand-strong audience. In Serbia, “Sputnik” uses infrastructure of the 
liquidated radio station “Voice of Russia.”
“Russia Today” broadcasts programs through the Internet portal “Vostok,” part of 
an international project called Beyond the Headlines (RBTH), founded in 2007. The 
project aims to increase Russia’s presence in foreign media in 23 countries and 29 in-
fluential newspapers, including New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post 
in the United States; Figaro in France; Handelsblatt in Germany; Republicca in Italy; 
El Pais in Spain; Global Times in China; and Politika and Geopolitika in Serbia. The 
project also has 20 websites in 16 languages. A big number of Serbian media outlets, 
including those financially linked to the government, to the large extent create con-
tent similar to Sputnik’s. Among them is Večernje Novosti, Politika, Pink, Studio B, 
Informer, Pečat, NSPM, Standard, Novi Standard, and Pravda. Nowadays there are 
plenty of Internet portals with a big number of subscribers in social media, which, 
like the above-mentioned media outlets, spread propaganda and often work to defame 
political opponents, channeling fake “facts” of various kinds. IN4S and Politikanews 
are among the most influential ones.
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The Russian “soft power” agents, especially “Sputnik,” are largely focused on Mon-
tenegro. Among about 300 articles about Montenegro before the 2017 parliamentary 
elections, 70% were critical of the local government. “Sputnik” pays particular atten-
tion to the prospect of Montenegro becoming a NATO Ally. It is proved by a number 
of headlines such as “Montenegro in NATO, an Eyesore for Russia” (Sputnik, 2015), 
“NATO Performs Territorial Cleansing of the Balkans,” “Montenegro – a pawn in 
a Large Chess Game,” “Zaharova: The question of accession of Montenegro to NATO 
to be solved in a referendum,” and “Đukanović leads Montenegro into new conflicts” 
(Sputnik, 2015).
A poll, conducted by the Russian-Serbian news agency Gazeta, whose goal was to 
determine a share of the population in Serbia interested in opening a Russian televi-
sion channel that would promote Russia’s interests, showed that 88% of respondents 
answered positively, while only 9% were against it (Vaseljenska, 2016).
Macedonia is also influenced by Russian interests, which resulted in the penetra-
tion by destructive information sources. Reputable Russian media, such as “Novaya 
Gazeta,” reported that somebody from the government of this Balkan country leaked 
a number of important documents to journalists of the international consortium Or-
ganized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP). Macedonian TV chan-
nel NOVA TV and the Serbian media KRIK joined their colleagues (Novaya Gazeta, 
2017). The information penetration is accompanied by the dynamic activity of intel-
ligence services. Such conglomerate – propaganda media and intelligence operations 
– has intensified its efforts after several Balkan countries announced their intention to 
become NATO Allies. For example, Montenegro’s coup attempt took place when, in 
April 2017, the Montenegrin Parliament supported the accession to the Alliance, and 
Macedonia and Bosnia received accession status. In materials submitted to the jour-
nalistic consortium, it is reported that honorary consulates in the Macedonian cities of 
Bitola and Ohrid act as intelligence outposts. It is reported that over the past nine years, 
Macedonia has been under the influence of powerful and devastating propaganda, as 
well as the activities of intelligence services acting from the Russian embassy. Russia 
uses “soft power” methods as part of its strategy to isolate the Balkans from the influ-
ence of the West. The Macedonian special bodies also mentioned in their reports that 
correspondents of the Russian News Agency TASS and representatives of Rossotrud-
nichestvo are agents of the Russian special services.
The opinion of the Macedonian investigative journalists proves our hypothesis. 
They claim that Russian agents attempted to influence the editorial policy and of-
fered financial support to the Macedonian media that supported Albanian minority in 
exchange for publishing Russian messages. It resembles the activity of Russian intel-
ligence services in the Ukrainian Transcarpathia, which constantly attempts to incite 
separatism among the Hungarian minority.
The Western Balkans are symbolic for Putin’s foreign policy. In Russia, many peo-
ple perceived the fall of Yugoslavia as an example of humiliation and ignoring inter-
ests of Moscow by the West. Russians are firmly convinced that in order to be a great 
power, they retain presence in the Balkans. Historically, the reason for this is: firstly, 
the interests of the Russian Empire in the control of the Bosporus Strait; and secondly, 
Moscow continues to spread the idea of “pan-slavism,” stating that there is a “special 
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connection between Russia and the Slavic nation of the Balkans.” The Russian propa-
ganda campaign is focused on Slavic Orthodox Serbian communities in the Balkans. 
The main tools of Russia’s information policy are the abovementioned television net-
work and Internet portal “Russia Today,” as well as the online news and radio service 
“Sputnik Srbija.”
The key message that is persistently being reproduced in Serbia is the following: 
there is a special connection between Russia and the Slavic / Orthodox communities 
in the Balkans. This statement is spread in several ways. First, moderators and authors 
of programs regularly place an emphasis on the common Slavic history and culture, 
focusing on the long and (in their messages) honorary participation of the Russian 
Empire in the fate of this part of the world. Secondly, the anti-Western rhetoric is being 
used, referring to certain events or ideas, for example, the bombing of Serbia in 1999 
by NATO troops.
The conspiracy theory about the permanent threat from the West is also being actively 
used. For example, the assumption that Madeleine Albright, who was the U.S. Secretary 
of State at the time when NATO bombed Yugoslavia, has “a pathological hatred for the 
Slavs.” Local pro-Russian analysts and politicians remind of Moscow’s veto on the UN 
resolution on genocide in Srebrenica and assistance in preventing Kosovo from being 
allowed to enter UNESCO. The Serbian government opposed Kosovo’s membership in 
UNESCO due to the unwillingness to officially recognize Kosovo. The West is described 
as culturally and mentally different, which (unlike Moscow) is unable to understand 
“Slavic exclusiveness.” The effect is amplified by a number of Balkan media. Accord-
ing to the information provided by the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies in Belgrade, 
109 organizations (including Russian funds and pro-Russian parliament members) are 
involved in the protection of various aspects of Serbian-Russian relations.
In fact, the emphasis on the Slavic brotherhood is not disinformation. But Russia 
is trying to impose the idea that the countries have fraternal relations. The identical 
idea was particularly active in the Ukrainian territory before Russia’s open aggression 
against Ukraine. Nowadays it is not so popular in pro-Russian media in Ukraine be-
cause the situation has changed. Nevertheless, in the Balkans, Russia is trying to create 
the positive image of Moscow, which views Slavic governments in Belgrade, Skopje 
or Banja Luka as equals.
At the same time, Western countries don’t offer alternative messages for citizens of 
the Balkan states, which would emphasize commitment to Euro-identity. As a result, 
Belgrade analysts claim that the support of the EU is on decline. Meanwhile, the com-
municative strategy of Russia yields good results. In Serbia, more people are inclined 
to say they would prefer an alliance with Russia (67.2% in favor and 18.8% against) 
than to say they would like to join the European Union (50.9% in favor and 38,8% 
against). Russian strategic communications don’t offer an alternative to the European 
Union. Perhaps, according to the calculations of the Kremlin strategists, it’s not yet 
time for a frank proposal. So far, the media can criticize Brussels and the overall Eu-
ropean policy but they don’t consider the Eurasian Union led by Moscow as a viable 
alternative to Belgrade.
The observers claim that Russia openly impedes the entry of the Balkan countries 
into NATO and encourages close military cooperation with the Collective Security 
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Treaty Organization (CSTO) supported by Moscow. Montenegro’s accession to NATO 
prompts Moscow to push Serbia’s military to cooperate more closely with Russian 
troops and join the CSTO alliance (Washington Post, 2016).
The region which borders the Western Balkans is also unstable. Following Poland 
(Isayev, 2017), pro-Russian nationalists appeared in Greece (Radio Svoboda, 2018).
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Pavlo Klimkin said during his interview 
with ATR channel that Russia was trying to exploit the situation with the language law 
and destabilize the situation in Hungary through the local right-wing forces (Censor, 
2017). Pro-Western Russian experts responded immediately (Samorukov, 2018).
Tools of the Russian “soft power” are used not only in Balkans, but also in the 
Baltic countries.The Baltic countries are not the ultimate goal for Russia – its goal 
is to destabilize the EU and NATO by using the Baltic countries. Such conclusion is 
contained in the analytical paper of the Operational Working Group on Asymmetric 
Operations “Ambiguous Threats and External Influences in the Baltic States “ (Public 
Intelligence, 2015). The similar situation is with Donbas, which is also not the final 
goal in Moscow’s geopolitical efforts.
Before exploring the strategic goals of Russia in the Baltic region, one should pay 
attention to the fact that these countries are in a slightly different position than the tem-
porarily annexed Crimea. For example, none of the Baltic states are base for Russian 
military units, while Sevastopol in Crimea was used as a base for Russian military and 
intelligence units. In addition, the Baltic region has another historical, cultural, and 
spiritual significance for Russia. In terms of security, the Baltic states, unlike Ukraine, 
are members of NATO and the EU.
In the report of the Asymmetric Operations Working Group, experts paid attention 
to the Gerasimov’s diagram of hybrid warfare (Gerasimov, 2013). If one considers 
Baltic states, it can be said that Russia is already on the second stage, “escalation” 
from the end of 2014, particularly aggravated during the Russian-Belarusian military 
exercises in September, 2017 (Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 2017). After that, there 
came conditional stabilization.
The “escalation” stage is characterized in the diagram as “differences that trans-
form into conflict.” Measures outlined in the diagram include economic sanctions, 
breach of diplomatic relations, continued information warfare, and military measures 
of strategic deterrence. Moscow has imposed an embargo on products from Baltic 
countries in response to EU sanctions. However, Baltic companies successfully diver-
sified supplies to alternative markets. Diplomatic relations between Russia and Baltic 
states are being preserved. Nevertheless, certain actions, such as the review by the 
Russian Attorney General of the legitimacy of independence of Baltic states intensify 
tensions and may potentially indicate a possible rupture of diplomatic ties.
The number of information operations in the region has increased, together with the 
quality of damaging messaging. Although the chart doesn’t define the effect of mili-
tary measures of strategic deterrence, a number of provocative incidents indicate their 
presence: constant invasion of Russian warships of territorial waters and sovereign 
airspace of the Baltics, Northern Europe and the United States, kidnapping of an Esto-
nian counter-intelligence operative at a border checkpoint, and setting up large-scale 
military exercises on the border with said countries. One can argue about how Rus-
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sian authorities actually see the transition from the stage of “escalating differences” to 
“crisis reaction.” But if we consider the measures indicated on the X-axis diagram, we 
can undoubtedly state that the Baltic states are at the stage of “escalation,” while the 
information component or Russia’s media presence remains high.
Information sphere is still the biggest problem. In Baltic countries, just as in 
Ukraine, Russian media dominate the information field. They have a higher quality 
content and remain more diverse, genre-based, and theme-oriented in accordance with 
the preferences of the audience. Their advantage is the significant financial support 
coming from the Kremlin. In the report by the Asymmetric Operations Working Group 
it is stated that, for example, in Estonia, Estonians and non-Estonians “live” in different 
media spaces. About 70% of the Russian-speaking population regularly reads newspa-
pers, and 85% – magazines. These readers have three Russian-language newspapers to 
choose from, published in Estonia. The Estonian newspaper “Postimees” publishes its 
Russian-language version three times a week and has a separate editorial team, includ-
ing the editor-in-chief. Radio is also a popular source of information for the population 
of Estonia, with 66% of Estonians and a slightly smaller number of Russians listening 
to it every day. Five Estonian radio stations broadcast in Russian, while residents of 
the Ida-Viru County in the north-east have access to radio stations broadcasting from 
across the border with Russia. In addition, the media project of the Russian state-
owned company “Russia Today” (“Rossiya Segodnya”) known as “Sputnik” mulls 
launch of radio stations in more than 30 countries. Television is the most divided me-
dia space: Estonians choose channels Kanal2, TV3, and ETV, all in Estonian, while 
non-Estonians opt for First Baltic Channel (FBС), NTV Mir, and RTR Planeta. The 
FBC is the most popular Russian-language channel, and most importantly, own-made 
Russian shows and information programs are being re-transmitted there.
In Latvia, as of 2013, three Russian TV channels are among the most popular ones 
in the country: RTR Planeta, FBK, and NTV Mir. Russian channels and programs are 
usually beyond competition, offering a wider variety and higher quality programs. The 
research, conducted in 2011, showed that those who speak Russian at home prefer Rus-
sian TV channels and consider them more reliable. Only around 9% of the respondents 
said they consider reliable Latvian channels. The influence of the Russian factor is so 
significant that Latvia officials claim Moscow is likely to interfere in parliamentary 
elections (Andreeva, 2018).
Air time of Russian programs in Lithuania can be increased at the expense of 
Lithuanian channels purchasing Russian content. At the same time, the number of Rus-
sian print media in Lithuania is decreasing; however, the most popular one is “Kom-
somolskaja pravda” weekly that has been on the market since 2008. In Ukraine, it 
also played its destructive and subversive role with propaganda-filled articles being 
published there. In big cities of Baltic states with a large share of Russian speakers, 
Russian radio stations, such as “Russkoje Radijo Baltija” in Vilnius and “Radio Ra-
duga” in Klaipėda, remain prominent, the authors of the thorough research note. The 
share of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic States provides the base for 
such operations.
In our study, we have also concluded that the destructive activity of dubious na-
tional or Russian media is aggravated by the deep penetration of intelligence tools 
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both in the media environment and public sector. In Ukraine, the process has reached 
its critical point when Moscow-loyal officials headed the Ministry of Defense and 
Security Service of Ukraine. It is a proven fact that a powerful and highly profes-
sional intelligence community of the Russian Federation acts as supervisors of media 
outlets, operating in the regions of Russian interest, as well as of Russian technology 
companies, whose services are used by journalists in different countries (Robertson 
and Riley, 2017). Above, we have analyzed the relation of Russian information and 
intelligence factors on the example of Macedonia.
This goes in line with the provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Fed-
eration. The Military Doctrine contains a definition of peculiarities of contemporary 
military conflicts: “Integrated use of military force, political, economic, information 
and other non-military measures that are implemented with the widespread use of 
the protest potential of the population and special operations forces.” The formula 
emerged in 2010 and has remained in place after the modification of the Doctrine in 
2014, after the start of the Russian aggression against Ukraine (Kremlin, 2014). The 
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation declares the lawful use of the armed forces 
outside the country to protect government interests and citizens in accordance with 
generally accepted principles and norms of international law and treaties (paragraphs 
22, 31, 32). According to paragraph 23 of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federa-
tion, the Armed Forces are used “based on early and ongoing analysis of the current 
military-political and military-strategic situation.” The paragraph directly points to the 
aggressive and offensive nature of the document and determines Russia’s actions in 
Ukraine today (Fedenko, Panasyuk, 2015: 281–282).
The 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation describes new conflict forms 
and methods currently used by Moscow in the territory of Ukraine and partly in Syria. 
Paragraph 15 lays down the creation in the territories of the warring parties of a per-
manent war zone; participation in hostilities of irregular armed groups and private 
military companies; use of indirect and asymmetric methods; and use of externally 
funded and run political forces and social movements. This includes national media in 
the countries where Russia has state, corporate, and energy interests.
In paragraphs 8 and partly 28 and 29 of the National Security Strategy of the Rus-
sian Federation, it is mentioned that “Russia has demonstrated the ability ... to protect 
the rights of its compatriots abroad” (RG, 2015).
* * *
Russia’s foreign policy employs a wide range of information, diplomatic, intelligence 
and energy tools of pressure and destructive influence primarily in the regions where 
it seeks to strengthen or reestablish its dominance. It is especially noticeable in the 
Balkans and Baltic States. We must state that the combination of these methods is quite 
systemic and effective. The experience gained with the use against Ukraine of their 
propaganda media, intelligence services, aggressive diplomacy, and energy blackmail, 
provides grounds for Moscow to use this toolkit in other countries and subregions. 
Russia will be forced to spend more and more resources (financial, organizational 
and informational) on such operations, while their effectiveness will decrease as local 
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governments, general public and individual citizens will learn to recognize threatening 
content spun by dubious media and public associations, as well as populist politicians 
or radical groups.
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aBstract
This article is devoted to the research of media space of several countries in the Western Bal-
kans and the Baltics, where we can observe the emergence and effective use of dubious media, 
in order to promote aggressive narratives, identified as a destructive influence of the Russian 
Federation. It is considered as the threat to the national security of these states. The informa-
tion tools of a destabilizing nature include diplomatic, intelligence, and energy tools. The me-
dia component of information influence has become the central object of research. It is stated 
that the destructive use of dubious national media, as well as their replenishment, takes place 
systematically and efficiently in those areas, where Russia’s state interests are focused on the 
restoration of its domination. On this basis we can conclude that dubious media is used within 
Russia’s hybrid aggression in relation to Ukraine, where it is seen as a mean of animating the 
externally initiated destabilizing political influences. However, Russia will be forced to spend 
more and more resources (financial, organizational and informational) on such operations, and 
their effectiveness will fall as local governments, society and citizens will learn how to recog-
nize the threats, retransmitted by dubious media, public associations, populist politicians or 
radicals.
 
Keywords: mass media, destructive impact, special information operations, states of the Bal-
kan Peninsula, Baltic States.
stresZcZeNie
Artykuł stanowi podsumowanie badań przestrzeni medialnej wybranych państw bałkańskich 
oraz bałtyckich, gdzie zaobserwować można pojawienie się i efektywne wykorzystanie środ-
ków masowej informacji (podszywających się pod media lokalne/narodowe) dla wytworzenia 
agresywnej narracji, którą przypisać można destruktywnemu wpływowi Federacji Rosyjskiej. 
Takie działanie należy oceniać jako zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa narodowego tych państw. 
Wśród narzędzi informacyjnych o charakterze destabilizującym, które mają na celu wywołanie 
chaosu (lub już go wywołały) w życiu wewnętrznym krajów tych regionów wymienić można: 
środki dyplomatyczne, zwiadowcze oraz energetyczne. Badania autorów skoncentrowały się 
zaś przede wszystkim na mediach.
Tworzenie, wykorzystanie oraz zasilanie owych “fałszywych” mediów odbywa się systema-
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tycznie i efektywnie tam, gdzie obecne są interesy rosyjskie, które nakierowane są na przywró-
cenie dominującej pozycji FR. Zakładając powyższe autorzy wyprowadzili tezę o wykorzysta-
niu fałszywych mediów w hybrydowej agresji Rosji na Ukrainę, gdzie są one postrzegane jako 
środki multiplikacji inicjowanych zewnętrznie czynników destabilizujących sytuację politycz-
ną. Oznacza to jednak, że Federacja Rosyjska będzie musiała rezerwować środki finansowe na 
prowadzenie kolejnych takich operacji informacyjnych, co może być kłopotliwe do wykonania. 
Owe perturbacje finansowe powinny z kolei spowodować osłabienie efektywności takowych 
operacji, także dlatego, że poszczególne rządy, społeczeństwa i pojedynczy obywatele nauczą 
się rozpoznawać zagrożenia, jakie wywołują fałszywe media, organizacje pozarządowe czy 
radykalni lub populistyczni politycy.
 
Słowa kluczowe: środki masowego przekazu, wpływ destrukcyjny, operacje informacyjne, 
państwa Półwyspu Bałkańskiego, państwa bałtyckie

